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Abstract:
The investment and involvement of business angels (BAs) in their investee companies is of
crucial importance for the development of young companies.
This research aims to explore BAs’ post-investment involvement in and impact upon their
investee companies in a dyadic way. It will examine several theories related to BA-intervention
and iteratively attempt to create a theoretical framework underpinning BA-involvement itself.
Due to a lack of literature and theories underpinning BA-involvement, this work follows several
authors' (e.g. Harrison & Mason, 1999; Ehrlich et al., 1994) requests for more investigation of
and theories in the post-investment period.
Theory development builds on prior research and previously applied concepts (e.g. agency and
resource-based theories) in the areas of BAs, venture capital, entrepreneurship and SMEs.
Business Angel Networks (BANs) and BAs themselves have been involved in the development of
this research and confirm its value.
This research administers a questionnaire-based survey, followed by longitudinal case studies
comprising of observations, interviews with BAs, entrepreneurs and occasional other related
people (e.g. accountants), as well as the analysis of secondary data.
The survey develops an initial understanding from the BAs' perspective of their involvement and
impact. The case studies will subsequently explore and explain the questionnaire findings in
more detail.
This approach, resulting in thorough, exploratory data, studies the viewpoints of both BAs and
investees and allows inductive theory-building.
The research is in its early stages and no definitive results are yet available. However, the
questionnaire has been sent out to BAs.
The author’s previous study (Macht, 2005), as well as preliminary findings of this research, has
shown that BAs are involved in their investee companies in many different roles and provide a
significant impact upon these companies, especially in relation to success, survival, efficiency
and profile of the investee. Some comments about BAs’ own view of their impact were, amongst
others, their provision of experience with handling unforeseeable events and their strategies for
avoiding their own prior mistakes.
This research will have a number of implications on both academia and practice, including the
following:
 Results should affect practitioners like BANs, e.g. in relation to investor- and investee-
training, awareness-raising, etc.
 Researchers obtain original knowledge in the neglected post-investment area and a
theoretical framework upon which further research can be based.
 Longitudinal case studies and observations, rarely used in BA-research, increase the
methodological multitude in the area.
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1. Introduction
The research underlying this paper focuses on business angels (BAs). They are defined here as
private, wealthy individuals who invest their own money as well as their time in small, young,
unquoted companies with whom they have no family connection (Sullivan & Miller, 1990;
Deakins & Freel, 2003). Due to many similarities with formal, institutional venture capital (VC),
business angels are also called ‘informal venture capitalists’ (Haar, Starr & MacMillan, 1988).
The main difference between BAs and VCs is that BAs invest in younger, earlier-stage
companies than VCs (Harrison & Mason, 2000).
It is widely known that BAs provide their investee companies with more than just money. BAs'
financial capital helps the investee company overcome funding difficulties common in young
enterprises (Sørheim, 2005). Additionally, BAs also spend time with their investees by offering
their skills, knowledge and experience in the form of post-investment involvement (e.g.
Ardichvili et al., 2002). This involvement has the potential to impact significantly upon a BA’s
investee companies.
However, both literature and theory have so far rather ignored the post-investment period of
BAs. Literature on BA-involvement is scarce and knowledge about the impact of BAs' non-
financial contributions is virtually nonexistent. The development of theories applicable to BAs
has also been hitherto neglected. Therefore, this study aims to
(i) contribute to the knowledge base about the under-researched post-investment period
and
(ii) add to the theoretical sophistication of the business angel discipline.
This paper is structured in the following way: First, the literature will be critically reviewed, both
in relation to BAs, as well as in relation to the theories that other researchers have attempted to
apply to them. The methodology section explores the methods used in the entire, ongoing
research project. The subsequent section provides an account of the questionnaire content and
some preliminary results of the empirical research. After a description of some limitations and
potential implications, the paper concludes with a short summary.
2. Literature Review
In 1999, Harrison and Mason identified three different generations of BA-research:
First generation studies, initiated in the United States in the 1980s and subsequently
replicated in other countries in the world (e.g. in Sweden by Landström in 1993 or in the UK by
Harrison and Mason in 1992a), focused solely on the ‘ABC’ of business angels, their Attitudes,
Behaviours and Characteristics (Freear, Sohl & Wetzel, 2002).
In second generation studies, researchers started to make the research area more
sophisticated: They investigated, amongst others, issues centring on the post-investment
period and they started applying existing theories to BAs and their investments. The application
of theories has up to now been the least developed category in research.
Finally, third generation studies are those areas, which researchers will have to
investigate in the future. Amongst the main directions that emerge are methodological and
theoretical issues. In terms of methodological subjects, new research designs, such as case
studies and longitudinal research are necessary. Theoretical frameworks previously applied to
business angels do not fit the area or provide unusable results. Therefore, more theory-building
is needed. Since the publication of the account of these generations in 1999, Harrison and
Mason’s calls for third generation research have already been followed to a certain extent: For
example, Sørheim (2005) helped to increase the methodological multitude by using in-depth
case studies. However, much work is still to be done into these directions.
The following subsections critically review the literature on the first and second generations of
informal venture capital research. They centre mainly on a few important characteristics of BAs,
on their post-investment behaviours, that is to say their involvement and impact, as well as on
the theories applied to BAs.
2.1 Characteristics of UK-Business Angels
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A majority of business angels display very similar characteristics and profiles in all countries, in
which they have been researched (Duxbury, Haines & Riding, 1996), but, when profiling them,
it has to be borne in mind that they are a heterogeneous group of people (Landström, 1993).
Almost all BAs are or have been entrepreneurs. They invest in industries that are familiar to
them, so that they can use their own experience to further their investees (Ardichvili et al.,
2002). They are primarily motivated by the financial return they can make from their
investments, but they also possess very strong non-financial motivations like the fun of being
involved or the opportunity to help new businesses. These secondary motives are often called
“psychic income” (Ehrlich et al., 1994, p. 70). Another characteristic of BAs is that they tend to
invest in close geographic proximity to either their home or their workplace, so that they can
pay the investee a visit at any time (Harrison, Mason & Robson, 2003). In addition, they are
most likely to invest in very young companies, mainly in the seed and start-up stages (Mason,
2002).
2.2 Business Angels’ Post-Investment Involvement
As the research on BAs’ post-investment period is, even worldwide, still rather scarce, one has
to resort to literature on the closely related, but better researched, discipline of formal venture
capital. However, it is crucial to remember that – in spite of some prominent similarities – BAs
and VCs possess critical differences, which do not allow researchers to use findings from the
two disciplines interchangeably.
One of the main characteristics of both formal and informal VC is the investor’s involvement
after the financial investment (Landström, 1993). It is also often referred to as ‘post-investment
value adding’ (Baeyens and Manigart, 2006), ‘contribution’ (Fried and Hisrich, 1988) or
‘assistance’ (Sapienza, Manigart & Vermeir, 1996).
Previous research categorised involvement activities into different groups. Sometimes, they are
divided into ‘active' and ‘passive' . For example, Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir (1996)
described passive involvement as the provision of only financial assistance, whereas active
involvement includes the additional supply of non-financial support to the investee company. On
other occasions, researchers divided the involvement activities into more distinct categories.
Sapienza, Amason and Manigart (1994) catalogued them as ‘strategic', ‘operational' and
‘personal' , whereas Gomez-Mejia, Balkin and Welbourne (1990) classified them into ‘formal’
(including membership on the board of directors, the right to observe meetings and the
monitoring of reports) and ‘informal’ (e.g. strategy sessions, unexpected phone calls and other
social activities with the management team). Fried and Hisrich (1995) catalogued the kinds of
possible VC-involvement into six main categories:
(i) Operating services: consulting, providing further funding, serving as a sounding
board, arranging partnerships, advising, managerial guidance, assistance with
mergers and acquisitions, evaluation of management team members, security-check
on strategies, focusing products or services, assistance in short-term crises and
problems and development of new strategy to meet changing circumstances
(ii) Networks: provision of contacts with potential other investors, underwriters, potential
other board members, management team members, service providers, customers,
suppliers or corporate partners
(iii) Image: the presence of a VC is a sign of quality and builds up confidence in the
investee company
(iv) Moral support: the VC can discuss sensitive issues, provide support in situations of
crisis and is a helpful, open and forthcoming partner or friend to talk to
(v) Knowledge in general business issues
(vi) Discipline: VCs pressurise the investee to comply with objectives or replace non-
performing management team members
(For the above-mentioned activities see: Arthurs & Busenitz, 2006; Fried & Hisrich, 1988; Fried
& Hisrich, 1995; Rosenstein et al., 1993; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).
In addition to these categories of involvement activities, two of the most influential research
studies into the involvement of VCs investigated the importance of the different roles which VCs
can play in their investee companies.
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MacMillan, Kulow and Khoylian (1988) found that the activities with most VC-
involvement were the following: being a sounding board to the investee company management,
strategic and operational planning, recruitment of managers, attaining alternative sources of
equity and debt, contacts to customers and suppliers, interfacing with the other investors and
monitoring financial or operating performance.
Gorman and Sahlman (1989) added the following further important involvement
activities: being a confidant, introductions to service providers (e.g. lawyers), board member
recruitments, right to use some resources of the VC, and the resolution of compensation
conflicts.
Apart from this large, but certainly not all-embracing, amount of possible involvement activities,
little is known about the actual role that VCs play in their investee companies (Fried, Bruton &
Hisrich, 1998). The literature about business angels' post-investment involvement, which will be
reviewed next, is even scarcer.
Just like VCs, BAs possess knowledge, skills, experience and business contacts, which they use
in order to contribute value to their investee companies. A study by Harrison and Mason
(1992b) concluded that only a minority of BAs monitor reports, meaning that they are involved
rather actively. Landström (1993) on the other hand characterised UK-business angels as
passive: many of them only review reports and participate at stockholder meetings, but display
very little involvement on a daily basis. The reason for this divergence might be explained by
the heterogeneity of angel investors: both studies agreed that a large proportion of BAs are
active, but also a significant amount of angels is passive.
According to several published papers, as well as according to the author’s own previous
research, BAs are involved in a very wide range of activities (Kelly & Hay, 2001; Macht, 2005;
Mason & Harrison, 1996). Since they invest earlier than VCs, they can help with the
development of the strategy. Other involvement possibilities are the following: member of the
board of directors, chairman of the board, provision of strategic advice, networking (e.g. with
potential customers), experience in marketing, finance, accounting, management and general
business, sounding board to the management team, follow-on finance and creation of
confidence in the investee. BAs can also supply some intangible contributions by lifting the
entrepreneur’s spirits, increasing enthusiasm, sharing the burden, providing a broader view or
being a coach and mentor.
Contributions provided by BAs are very similar to those provided by formal VCs (Ehrlich et al.,
1994). Nevertheless, the two investor types differ in their involvement in many ways:
First, BAs tend to invest in earlier stages than VCs, where the management of the
investee companies often do not yet possess the experience necessary to handle all occurring
situations, rendering the involvement of the BA crucial (Månsson & Landström, 2005).
Second, although VCs can become involved in all managerial activities, they usually
confine themselves to unique projects (Fried & Hisrich, 1995). They only intervene on the
operational day-to-day basis if major problems arise (Sweeting, 1991). Most BAs also do not
get involved operationally (Politis & Landström, 2002), whereas some of them start working for
the investee company, as salaried consultants, advisors or even employees (Kelly & Hay, 2003).
Third, some activities are unique to each investor type: VCs replace members of the
management team (Rosenstein et al., 1993), whereas BAs provide their competences and their
small investment amounts to prepare the investee company for subsequent VC investment
(Månsson & Landström, 2005).
Fourthly, as BAs – unlike formal VCs – do not have to invest their money, they do not
posses as stringent time constraints as VCs. This allows them more time for active involvement.
At the same time, BAs do not have the time to play an active role in many portfolio companies
simultaneously (Mason & Harrison, 2002).
2.3 Business Angels’ Post-Investment Impact
Literature on the impact of BAs’ involvement is extremely scarce, which again necessitates
falling back on the literature on formal VC. The latter displays some evidence of VCs' impact.
However, since these studies were conducted on large organisations, the findings may not be
fully applicable to BAs and small, young ventures (Fried & Hisrich, 1995).
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In general, research into ‘value added’ by VCs has been conducted by either scrutinising stock
returns after the initial public offering or by questioning the VCs and/or CEOs of investee
companies (Sapienza, 1992). Data resulting from questioning VCs and/or CEOs displays findings
from individual or dyadic viewpoints (perspectives of venture capitalists only: see e.g. Gorman
& Sahlman (1989); entrepreneurs only: see e.g. Rosenstein et al. (1993); both VCs and CEOs:
see e.g. Sapienza & Timmons (1989)).
Unfortunately, most of these general studies mention the impact of involvement activities only
marginally. They rather focus on issues like the mere involvement activities (e.g. MacMillan,
Kulow & Khoylian, 1988), the usefulness of these roles from different viewpoints (e.g.
Rosenstein et al., 1993) or the contextual factors of the involvement (e.g. Sapienza, Amason &
Manigart, 1994). Those studies where the impact is mentioned will be reviewed below.
Researchers studying the post-investment impact face a crucial problem: the difficulty of
measuring it. Many scholars use ‘performance’ as a measurement for value added: One of the
main findings of Rosenstein et al.’s (1993) questionnaire was that VCs do not increase firm-
performance more than any other outside board members. Equally, Sapienza, Manigart and
Vermeir (1996), as well as Sweeting and Wong (1997), did not find any relation between the
performance of the venture and the involvement of the VC. Fried, Bruton and Hisrich (1998)
even concluded that VC-involvement on the board could negatively affect the performance of
the investee. Constructive strategic feedback provided by the VC on the other hand should lead
to improved decision-making and enhanced performance of the investee company (Busenitz,
Fiet & Moesel, 2004).
Performance can be measured by a large array of different indicators. Financial measures, like
the profitability of the VC’s exit, are often used (e.g. Busenitz, Fiet & Moesel, 2004). Other
examples of performance indicators applied in the VC-context are sales volume, net profits,
market share, return on investment (Sweeting & Wong, 1997), as well as a number of non-
financial criteria like “new product/process development, market development, operating
efficiency, personnel development [and] harvest/exit readiness” (Higashide & Birley, 2002, p.
66). Sometimes, even subjective, non-numerical performance indicators like the VC’s
satisfaction with the entrepreneur’s performance are utilised (Sapienza, Manigart & Vermeir,
1996).
However, measuring impact in terms of a venture’s performance can be severely criticised:
Financial performance indicators in general are not only useless for very young firms without
proper financial systems, but also evaluate more the impact upon the VC than upon the
investee company. Other measurements might also not be applicable to young investee
companies due to their newness (Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000). Furthermore, measuring
venture performance in comparison to competition is impossible for angel-funded businesses
since there is often no information about competitors available (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2006).
Qualitative indicators might be a solution, but are inseparable from self-report bias (Sapienza,
Manigart & Vermeir, 1996). Finally, related to the multitude of different indicators is the
difficulty of comparing results.
Due to these shortcomings, some researchers used other indicators than performance to
measure the value added impact: For example Davila, Foster and Gupta (2003) used an
increase in headcount as a proxy for growth. In reality however, headcount is only a minor
measure of growth.
An important limitation of VC-impact is that VCs can only add value if the entrepreneur is
responsive to the involvement and keen to learn (Sapienza, Manigart & Vermeir, 1996). This
can be achieved if the parties continuously share information in a cooperative way. Ongoing
information-sharing should result in better organisational learning for the venture (Busenitz,
Fiet & Moesel, 2004). Arthurs and Busenitz (2006) also argued that VCs can impact upon their
investee companies by increasing the venture’s strategic and operational learning: VCs possess
experience in the ways in which changes within the external business environment affect
businesses. They can use this knowledge to educate their investee companies, so that the latter
can better adapt to transformations in the environment.
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Since so far, only the impact of VCs has been reviewed, the following paragraphs will be
devoted to BAs' impact.
Sørheim (2005), in one of the few papers about business angels' impact, investigated one area
of BA-involvement in more detail: their facilitation of further financing for their investee
companies. BAs can be boundary-spanners participating at negotiations, door-openers by
presenting their own view about the venture to potential investors, providers of financial
packages due to their extensive experience or co-entrepreneurs by using their own expertise in
raising capital. Due to BAs’ networking amongst each other, they often bring other BAs into
their investments, which also facilitates the reception of further funding.
Another form of impact is the confidence that the investment of BAs creates within a venture:
although the results are not unequivocal, many VCs regard the investment and involvement of
business angels as a positive sign for quality and thus decide to also invest in this business
(Harrison & Mason, 2000). This is sometimes referred to as ‘leverage effect’ (e.g. Mason &
Harrison, 1995).
Neither the record of impacts above nor the BA-literature depicts an all-inclusive listing of
possible impacts. The kinds of impact described in the literature are dispersed and represent
only a rather generic account of possible involvement activities and their general impact.
Harrison and Mason (2004) attempt to capture more possible involvement and impact types by
questioning BA-entrepreneur-dyads about critical incidents that happened during their
relationship. They want to examine if and to what extent BAs actually add value in such critical
situations. Unfortunately, this research project is still ongoing.
Fried and Hisrich (1995) concluded that the impact of relationship investors (VCs and BAs) can
be significant, but the value added and the effectiveness of this added value vary from company
to company. Therefore, more empirically grounded research into the post-investment period, as
well as a detailed investigation of specific cases is very important in identifying BAs’ value
adding capabilities.
Research should start focussing on other aspects of impact due to the before-mentioned flaws
of measuring it with the likes of performance or growth. Some researchers already touch on
several other possible measurements: improved decision-making (Busenitz, Fiet & Moesel,
2004) and operational learning (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2006) can increase a business’s success,
expertise that helps investee companies adapt to changing circumstances increases its survival
chances (ibid.), confidence in the business improves its profile in the eyes of externals (Fried &
Hisrich, 1995) and the provision of contact networks increases efficiency because the
management team do not have to spend time searching for these contacts themselves (Macht,
2005).
When examining the impact, one has to bear in mind that the effect of VC-involvement upon
the investee company can occur in several directions: Inputs can be constructive, impotent or
destructive. If an input is constructive, it adds value. If it is impotent, it does not have any
effect, whereas destructive input destroys value (Fried & Hisrich, 1995). For example, investors
can encourage the entrepreneur to carefully think through every option before acting, which
takes time and could end up making the entrepreneur work less efficiently (Busenitz, Fiet &
Moesel, 2004).
2.3 Theories Applied to Business Angels
In addition to the lack of research in BAs’ post-investment period, the entire area of
entrepreneurship is further characterised by a lack of theoretical frameworks (Phan, 2004). The
main reason for this is the fact that theories were usually developed for large organisations,
which are intrinsically different from small businesses, especially from young, entrepreneurial
ventures (Dandridge, 1979). Distinct theories for small businesses and entrepreneurship are
necessary in order to be able to properly understand these areas.
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As with empirical research, the main focus in previous theory application and building has also
been on formal VC. However, some researchers are now entering the second and third
generations of BA-research and apply or develop theories for angel investments. What has been
concluded in most cases for both formal and informal VC is an absence of suitability of existing
theories (Cable & Shane, 1997).
Agency theory, one of the most widely-used theories, has been frequently applied to VC, but
has been found to not be entirely suitable. It focuses on the relationship between principals
(investors) and agents (entrepreneurial management team). This separation of ownership and
control can lead to conflicts due to different interests of the participating parties (Bruton, Fried
& Hisrich, 2000). In order to reduce these agency risks, investors monitor their investee
companies for example through active involvement (Busenitz, Fiet & Moesel, 2004). The studies
using agency theory for VC concluded that it is not overly applicable: the relationship between
investor and entrepreneur is better characterised by a joint venture with possible mutual gains,
than by a principal-agent-relationship (Sweeting & Wong, 1997). This is in contrast to a crucial
assumption of agency theory: a strictly hierarchical relationship (Cable & Shane, 1997).
Furthermore, agency theory assumes that principal and agent are only motivated by financial or
economic factors, whereas entrepreneurs and BAs are often driven by non-financial motivations
(Wijbenga et al., 2003).
Another theory often used in VC-research, which also overcomes some of the weaknesses of
agency theory, is the Prisoner’s Dilemma framework. Here, a conflict exists or develops
between interdependent parties (Cable & Shane, 1997). Both parties can either follow their
individual self-interest to receive a certain payoff or cooperate to collectively obtain a larger
payoff. However, due to asymmetric information, the parties do not know the extent of the
payoffs. The angel-investee-relationship and the angel’s non-financial involvement are at least
as important as the funding itself, which implies that cooperation is a critical part of an investor-
investee-connection. The Prisoner’s Dilemma framework is more useful than agency theory for
BAs and investee companies, amongst others because it does not assume a hierarchical
relationship between the parties (Bruton, Fried & Hisrich, 2000; Cable & Shane, 1997).
However, it focuses on the investor-investee relationship, but neither on the BAs’ involvement
activities, nor on their impact, making also this framework not totally suitable for the post-
investment period.
The resource-based view also finds many possibilities of application in entrepreneurship, in spite
of having been developed in strategic management (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2006). Resources are
defined as
“all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information,
knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991,
p. 101).
Ardichvili et al. (2002) studied the different types of resources that angel investors can
contribute to their investee companies and identified five main categories: human, social,
physical, organisational and financial capital. Human capital is embedded in human beings and
consists of their skills, knowledge and abilities (Erikson & Nerdrum, 2001; Ardichvili et al.,
2002). Business angels certainly bring human capital to the investee company by contributing
their own knowledge, experience and skills. In addition to that, BAs can increase the human
capital of the investee company’s employees who can learn from them. Social capital
constitutes the resources that are and can be obtained through social relationship networks
(Sørheim, 2005). BAs increase the social capital of the company by providing their own
networks of contacts and by thus growing the venture’s contact base. One example of this
increase is the introduction of other investors to the company, which enhances both the
relationships that the business has with external financiers and the chances of further funding.
Physical resources are tangible assets like machines or factories, whereas organisational capital
is knowledge embedded in the organisational culture, databases, manuals or patents. Apart
from educating employees, BAs can also make the business learn from their own experience
and thus increase organisational capital. Financial capital consists of equity and debt and it is
the one resource that initiates the relationship with business angels (Cassar, 2003).
Consequently, BAs are capable of adding value through their knowledge of and access to
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resources, their skills to negotiate for resources, and/or their abilities to develop resources
(Ardichvili et al., 2002).
All in all, resource-based theory seems to be a good conceptual framework for BA-investments.
This is consistent with Sørheim’s (2005) conclusion that insights from social capital theory
appear to be viable for investigating certain BA involvement activities. However, research will
have to make a few adaptations: Human capital for example is usually focussing on the
knowledge, skills etc. of the employees and entrepreneurs, but not on the resources within the
investor (Ardichvili et al., 2002). Since BAs are more than financial investors, researchers
should consider including them in human capital theory.
In addition to the above-explained theories, many other researchers have attempted to apply
different theoretical frameworks to formal and informal VC. Only to mention some of them:
Procedural Justice (e.g. Busenitz, Fiet & Moesel, 2004), learning and knowledge-based view (De
Clercq & Sapienza, 2002), resource exchange theory (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin & Welbourne, 1990)
or incomplete contracts (Ardichvili et al., 2002).
All theories have one thing in common: Only a few of their aspects are entirely applicable to the
small business, entrepreneurship, venture capital and business angel context. In order to be
fully suitable for BAs, the existing theories require adaptation (Sapienza, Manigart & Vermeir,
1996). Sullivan and Miller (1990, p. 305) tellingly summarise this view: Although formal theory
can present an important opportunity to BA-research, “borrowing of formal theory from other
disciplines may not be fully suitable to the idiosyncratic needs and views of our particular field”.
3. Methodology
The aims of this research project are to investigate business angels’ post-investment
involvement in and impact upon their investee companies in order to increase the
understanding of the BA-discipline. Furthermore, the project aims to build an original theoretical
backing for the post-investment period of BA-investments. In order to achieve these aims, this
research applies a mixed methods approach consisting of two main stages:
1. Questionnaire-based survey
2. Longitudinal case studies with interviews, observations and the analysis of secondary
data
The questions of the questionnaire have been developed from the results of both literature
review and informal discussions with experts in the BA field (business angels themselves,
entrepreneurs, academics, business angel network managers and other people with close
contacts to angel investors, e.g. bankers and lawyers). These conversations took place between
October 2004 and March 2006 (also as part of Macht, 2005).
The questionnaire captures the views of angel investors on their involvement activities and on
their perceived impact upon their investee companies. The purpose of the questionnaire is
twofold: On the one hand it establishes what BAs do after their financial investment and how
they impact upon the investee and on the other hand it will be used to inform the second stage
of the project.
Since BAs prefer to stay anonymous, it is impossible to target them personally (Harrison &
Mason, 1992a): The questionnaire had to be distributed through intermediaries, especially
business angel networks (BANs). In order to be as unobtrusive and uncomplicated for
respondents as possible, the questionnaire was developed as an electronic document and also
as an online questionnaire on www.surveymonkey.com. BANs in the entire UK distributed the
document and the link to the online version between April and July 2006, with the data
collection due to finish at the end of September 2006. In addition to that, BAs familiar to the
author were asked to distribute the questionnaire to other angels they know, a method called
‘snowballing’ (Duxbury, Haines & Riding, 1996). Furthermore, investee companies acquainted
through previous research (Macht, 2005) were asked to distribute the questionnaire to their
investors. This multitude of different ways of distribution is important for BA-research: Due to
the invisibility and anonymity of the market, it is impossible to know the entire population.
Therefore, no sampling method can result in representative findings. However, the choice of
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several different ways of distribution increases the likelihood of the sample actually being
representative and thus reduces bias (Mason & Harrison, 2002).
The second stage of this research project will be conducted sequentially after the administration
of the questionnaire. It consists of qualitative, longitudinal case studies of four angel-investee
company-dyads. The longitudinal element will allow studying the impact of the participating BAs
and the change it makes to the company over time (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 1997). The
case studies will begin in January 2007 and comprise of interviews and observations over the
period of 12 months.
The contents of the first few interviews will be based upon literature and the results of the
questionnaire, whereas the following interviews will rest upon the findings of all previous
interviews. This design allows potential changes in direction, should the data call for them. In
addition to questioning BAs and the directors of the participating firms, this research attempts
to create comprehensive, detailed knowledge about the cases by also including occasional
interviews with other people related to the dyads, like other investors, bankers or accountants
(ibid.). In addition to interviews, BAs will sporadically be observed when they become involved
in their investee companies, for example at board meetings. Furthermore, secondary data like
minutes and agendas of meetings will be used to complete the impression of BAs’ involvement
and impact.
In spite of the plan to start the case studies in January, it was deemed useful to initiate the
contacts with the participants by already conducting a few initial, informal interviews and
observations with and of the respondents from April 2006.
Most previous research has been conducted with the use of questionnaires or interviews.
Researchers like Sohl (1999) or Harrison and Mason (1999) have called for different
methodologies, including case studies and observations, which this research project follows.
In addition to the empirical research, this study attempts to iteratively create a theoretical
framework, which can be applied to business angels. The new theoretical framework will be
based on the best suitable existing theories and parts of existing theories. The main theory-
building process will begin with the administration of the case studies: First, literature review on
theories will be used to develop interview questions, then interview transcripts and observation
diaries will be analysed with regard to these theories. This should result in either reviewing
more literature about those theories, or in an alteration of focus into the direction of different
theories. Those theories that are chosen after the first data collection phase will then be
incorporated into a further data collection phase. Depending on the outcomes from that second
phase, further literature will be reviewed about either the already selected theories or about
newly emerging ones. This will continue in a circular, iterative way until an appropriate
theoretical backing is achieved.
This way of theory-building has not been used to a great extent, but it is valuable because it
allows the emerging theory to be empirically well grounded (Eisenhardt, 1989). The theory will
materialize with the help of the existing theories, but none of them will be rejected at an early
stage. Agency theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma and the resource-based view have been identified to
be of major importance, but data collection will not be limited to only those. When building
theories from case studies, it is important to be flexible in terms of not only possible bases, but
also in terms of data collection methods: Triangulation, “the combination of methodologies in
the study of the same phenomenon” (Jick, 1979, p. 602), will be applied here through the
usage of questionnaires, interviews, observations and the analysis of secondary data.
Triangulation is extremely important for this kind of theory-building because it allows a stronger
grounding of the emerging construct (Eisenhardt, 1989).
4. Questionnaire Content and Preliminary Results
The questionnaire comprises four main sections:
The first section asks about the respondents’ backgrounds, replicating questions about
the ABCs of business angels. This is important in order to relate involvement and impact to the
angels’ particular characteristics.
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Section two enquires general issues about the respondents’ involvement in their investee
companies. Subjects like the angels’ own perception of their activeness of involvement and
reasons for becoming involved are present in this section alongside information about the
amount of time the angel spends with the company, the resources s/he provides to the investee
and the entrepreneur’s perpetuation of these resources. Furthermore, the respondents are
asked whether they offered their involvement voluntarily and whether they have ever received
any investment training.
In the third section, respondents are asked to choose an investment that is typical for
them and provide some general information about this investee company, amongst others the
stage of development, the industry and geographic location. Afterwards, a list of possible
investment activities, adapted from MacMillan, Kulow and Khoylian (1988), asks for an
indication of how important the activities are with regards to the investee companies. A 5-point
scale ranging from ‘not important at all’ to ‘very important’ is provided.
The final section lists the activities again asking for an explanation of how they influence
efficiency, profile and success or survival of the investee companies. Another 5-point scale
ranging from ‘very negative influence’ to ‘very positive influence’ was provided, which will in a
final analysis be weighted with the results from the other scaled question. Furthermore, the
angels are asked whether their financial or non-financial investment is more important to the
investee, in which stages involvement is most important and how responsive entrepreneurs
were to the involvement activities. A final open question requires the respondents to indicate
what – in their own view – their largest impact is.
Since the questionnaire will still be live until the end of September, no thorough analysis of the
so far sixty-four usable responses has been possible yet. Also the informal interviews have not
been analysed rigorously. An early account of some striking initial findings of both questionnaire
and case studies is provided below:
Nearly all respondents provided their networks of contacts, skills, knowledge and experience to
their investee companies. However, not all entrepreneurs then perpetuated these resources.
In terms of importance of certain activities with regards to the investee company, most
activities were ranked as ‘important’ and some as ‘very important’. However, there are also a
number of indications that the activities are ‘indifferent’ and the exceptional response that an
activity is ‘not important’ or ‘not important at all’. In this case, especially the responses for the
BA as a full- or part-time employee in the investee company stick out: 31% think that it is not
important at all and 14% consider it not important, whereas only 24% think it is important and
no responses for ‘very important’ have been recorded. This is in contrast to an early observation
from the case studies: the investee company had to discard of their sales representative due to
the latter’s lack of commitment, which had lead the business into cash flow difficulties. The
current managing director is an experienced sales person, but would have to give up many of
his current duties in order to take on the sales responsibilities. The BA, who is savvy in
entrepreneurial, financial and general management issues, offered to become employed as a
managing director on a part-time basis in order to manage the company financially and
strategically and in order to apply his own experience to improve the company from within. He
has recently offered to do that job for a modest compensation and on the short run, with the
possibility of increasing the duration, should the circumstances require it.
Most activities were considered to influence efficiency, profile and success or survival in a
positive or very positive way, but also with a substantial number of investors rating the
influence as indifferent. Again, the role as an employee sticks out: it is the only activity that
was mentioned by some respondents as having a negative influence upon the company in each
of the three categories.
In this case, the question arises: If so many BAs think that being an employee of the investee is
unimportant and has a negative influence on success, survival, efficiency and profile, why does
this particular BA consider it to be of high importance and useful for the venture? This and other
questions will be dealt with in the interviews.
The open question concerning the investors’ own perception of their impact resulted in a wide
array of interesting comments. Most of them can be summarised under the heading of
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‘experience’, e.g. experience with handling unforeseen events, financial and broader
management experience or the avoidance of own, previously-made mistakes. Another general
heading could be ‘objectivity’, e.g. the independent assessment of strategy or a realistic
estimation of future development plans. These comments will certainly be incorporated into the
case study interviews to investigate them in more detail.
5. Limitations and Implications
Due to the invisibility of the business angel market, researchers have to rely on convenience
sampling, which usually makes the results unrepresentative (Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 1994).
However, the entire population of BAs being unknowable, no study can be verifiably
representative, which justifies the usage of convenience sampling in BA research (Mason &
Harrison, 2002).
Self-selection bias will probably occur in that only successful investors respond to the
questionnaire and participate in case studies (Haar, Starr & MacMillan, 1988). Besides, it is
questionable whether the responses are honest, because investors might want to present
themselves better than they really are (Mason & Harrison, 2002).
Response-bias is another problem, but it is impossible to test this bias because of a lack of
information about non-respondents (Mason & Harrison, 2004). In addition to that, the
questionnaire only requires response from one party of the investment, which might reduce
validity of the results. However, the dyadic view that will be taken in the subsequent case study
phase will increase the validity of the entire project (Sapienza, 1992).
Another limitation is that the number of case studies has to be restricted to four due to time
constraints.
This research study will have implications on academia as well as on practice: Longitudinal, in-
depth case studies with observations have so far been rather neglected in the BA research field
(Paul, Whittam & Johnston, 2003). Therefore, this research will increase the methodological
multitude in the area and create original knowledge about BAs and their post-investment
period. In addition to that, the study will result in a proposed theoretical model applicable to
business angels and thus increase the theoretical backing in the area (Van Osnabrugge, 2000).
The research has been developed in close consultation with BAs and BANs who have confirmed
the value of the findings because they can show what business angels really do and how this
impacts upon the investee companies. In doing so, the results can be used to educate investors
and investees alike, to improve matching between business angels and entrepreneurs looking
for funding and to increase awareness of angel investors and their possible benefits and
downsides.
6. Summary
In spite of business angels’ importance for financing young, entrepreneurial ventures, their
post-investment period has been a rather neglected area of research. The research project
underlying this paper focuses on BAs’ post-investment involvement in and impact upon their
investee companies by using a mixed methods approach: an online-questionnaire-based survey
discovers angel investors’ views on their involvement and impact before the results will then
inform interviews. These interviews are, together with observations and the analysis of
secondary data, part of longitudinal case studies. This research design fits the nature of the
project well. Due to a lack of suitable theoretical frameworks for business angels, the study will
simultaneously use the findings from the primary research to build on existing theories in order
to iteratively create a new theoretical backing suitable for BAs and their investments.
The BA-research area is characterised by a number of problems of both theoretical (e.g. strong
reliance on VC-literature is needed) and practical (e.g. difficulties in locating research
participants) nature. However, the author has so far managed to conduct her research as
expected. One of the reasons for that is an extraordinarily high interest in the topic and thus
support and cooperation from both BANs and BAs.
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The interim results from the questionnaire and initial case studies suggest that BAs are involved
in a large array of different activities, some of which can improve the investee company’s
success or survival, efficiency or profile in the eyes of externals. Some activities on the other
hand destroy value by having a negative impact upon the investee.
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